Introduction
Recently, Robert Kaplan published a short commentary at the Center for New American Security. His aim was to add some perspective to the celebration of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. By and large, I think he did a fair job of explaining why the fall of the wall didn’t usher an end to history. However, I’d like to offer two brief critiques.
Holy Grail Democracy
There’s an assumption that resolving the Iranian crisis could start the process of democratizing the Middle East:
Iran holds the key to changing the Middle East, much as the collapse of the Berlin Wall held the key to changing Europe. With a reformist regime in power in Teheran, turmoil in Iraq will lessen and Hezbollah may eventually be robbed of a sturdy patron, even as Syria is forced to make its peace with the West, and hopefully with Israel, too. All that, taken together, will release nascent democratic forces that can truly reform the Middle East.
I’ll grant that democratic governments are more transparent, but I still wonder how a reformist Iran could move the region toward greater stability. It’s not as though geopolitical considerations would simply vanish because Iran’s power is restructured. It’s taken as a matter of faith that democracies don’t fight one another, but I still think it’s too early to tell.
Most zero-sum thinking is limited. Just because I win doesn’t mean you have to lose. But in the case of Russia, who is the most active nation resisting U.S. policies, there is certainly a loser. Even if peace could come to the Middle East via a changed Iran, it’s not clear to me that there’s any reduction in global tensions. It just shifts them a bit. With Russia rebuffed in the Middle East, the Putin regime becomes more, not less, nervous as a result of this victory.
Alone was our Choice
The other bit worth mention regards the old saw that Europe needs to do more:
But America is much too alone in taking on this work. Europe, having been liberated from nuclear terror at the conclusion of the Cold War, proved unable to muster the gumption to deal with Yugoslavia on its own, or, as the case of Afghanistan shows, to demonstrate much enthusiasm for any great collective effort. Which leads to the question: What does the European Union truly stand for besides a cradle-to-grave social welfare system? For without something to struggle for, there can be no civil society – only decadence.
The only choice is between civil society and decadence? Thanks Bob, but I think there are some spaces between the extremes. I consider this statement to be a false dichotomy employed for literary effect, so I’ll forgive it.
But what of his main point, that of America bearing too much of the burden? There’s a lot of truth to that statement, but there is a lack of perspective. Subsequent U.S. administrations have urged Europe to pick up the slack amidst a broad strategy dedicated to diffusing power as much as possible so that no regional competitor can challenge it.
Desiring that Europe take up a stronger military burden is very nice, but who do you want doing this? Great Britain, France, Germany? The very enviable social welfare system beloved by many Europeans exists precisely because America underwrites their national defense costs. Also, some European powers would be happy to take up more of the slack provided that it wasn’t under the aegis of implicit U.S. control. Note how NATO has atrophied over the years? For all the talk of multilateralism, the primary bulk of NATO strength is concentrated in the American military.
Drastic change only occurs when a state is faced with an existential threat. America before 9/11 couldn’t help but consider trans-national terrorism as minor issue. No matter how many alarmed intelligence officers spoke before Congress, nothing serious would be done. Similarly, the nations of Europe aren’t going to beef up their militaries because the U.S. says “please.”
What we don’t see coming
This brings me to my old saw, which is that the stuff we don’t see coming is what really matters. Those who follow society’s adoption of new technologies already know this. Most reasonable and intelligent people couldn’t foresee the internet being quite the force it turned out to be. I wonder how many of those people could even imagine a past that doesn’t include it.
Recently, Moisés Naím wrote an interesting piece for Foreign Policy. He outlined the four surprises that materialized after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I thoroughly recommend a reading of this brief article as it provides a glimpse of how the world changes in ways that experts routinely get wrong. I’m certainly no expert, but I do know quite a lot about being wrong.
The occasion of this anniversary caused me to revisit the news coverage of the fall of the Wall in 1989 as well as the attempted Russian coup in 1991. Among the many newscasts that I bored my son with was a very learned political analyst who was quite certain that the KGB was in control of the unrest in Russia. Indeed, it was merely a cover for whatever brutality was their true plan. This analyst might have been right, but he turned out to be wrong. Shortly thereafter, a lot more colored blobs appeared on our world maps as the U.S.S.R. disintegrated.
Everyone was caught off balance, but that hasn’t stopped experts from assuming that history will continue to move in a straight, predictable line.
