Limited Options in the Current Mess (Part 2)

The previous post ended by wondering what the likely responses in the U.S./Iranian crisis might be. In a StratFor article, George Friedman states the options available to any U.S. administration wishing to continue American dominance of the international system. He concludes that you can maintain the balance of power yourself, share it with others, or coerce others using the following three options: Live with it, forge an alliance with it, or attack it.

My assumption is that the American public is not interested in ceding its position as a global hegemon. It’s now the cornerstone of U.S. national security. Moreover, our material prosperity is due to single handedly running the global economic system. With the available information I will make a series of predictions. Please do not confuse my view of what is likely with my view of what is right.

What we’re doing now

The U.S. is pushing as hard as it can without rocking the boat. The willingness to upturn the boat is on everyone’s mind. Is Obama bluffing when he threatens military action? Foreign governments have a perception that Obama is weak and won’t follow through with his threats. Sooner or later we’ll find out what he’s willing to do. The right is convinced that Obama is weak. The left is convinced that Obama would never start a war. In my estimation, both are running in partisan circles.

The Obama administration is taking a wait-and-see approach, hoping it can make use of an advantageous turn of events. They’re playing for time, hoping for the best, and revising their contingency plans. Sometimes I see it as doing a whole lot of nothing. This is a rich tradition in geopolitics, but it’s an erroneous assumption. The U.S. wants the Iranian political establishment to alter its behavior. The U.S. also wants the Russians to support our bid for sanctions. Here are the three stated options along with my predictions:

1. Live with Iran

The U.S. would reluctantly accept the idea of Iran as an eventual nuclear power. With the help of more coalition strategies, the U.S. would seek to contain it. Iran would compete mainly with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the hopes of being considered the Islamist power of the region. But many of these actors, including Israel, would feel betrayed by the U.S. They would harbor resentment that would translate into hastening the end of undue reliance on U.S. protection. They would not upturn their foreign policy, though. Diplomatic gerrymandering would see to that.

Partisan responses: The left would like the idea of American power taking a constrained stance and creating space for a multi-polar world. They’ll believe that it will set the stage for further respect for America’s power. The right would accuse the president of weakness but eventually come to enjoy that we could turn our attention elsewhere. Assuming that “war is bad”, both would accept it as the most moral option.

Result: On the surface, it will create the illusion of respect for America’s power, but it won’t actually creating more America-friendly policies. This move will show the international community that so long as they have enough tools, they can pursue antagonistic policies with little resistance.

This will create problems down the road. Other nations might incorrectly assume that they’re in a position of strength, but they’d lack Iran’s favorable geography and resources. The U.S. would again need to prove they are not a paper tiger in order to maintain the international order. Encountering growing resistance to their foreign policy initiatives, the U.S. would lash out at the next regional actor to pose a threat.

Short-Term Likelihood: Somewhat possible

2. Form an alliance with Iran

Happening suddenly or as a continuation of the prior scenario, this would quickly move the U.S.’s Iran policy from one of containment to normalization. The U.S. would invest heavily, and (with enough industrial carrots) reorient Iranian foreign policy against Russia. The U.S. would effectively become their new big-power patron. This would upset Israel and Turkey even more than the prior scenario as it would challenge their ascension as dominant regional powers.

Partisan responses: The left would love the idea of America breaking bread with Iran, though the pace of change might make them nervous for reasons they cannot articulate. The symbolism would resonate, though. As with the prior scenario, the right would make a lot of noise but enjoy usurping Russia’s role in the region. One generation later, both would come to see this U.S./Iran relationship as perfectly natural.

Result: Israel would switch patrons from the U.S. to Russia, much as they switched from Russia to the U.S. during the cold war. All Iranian competitors in the region would regard American power with open hostility. The exception would be if they received enough American guns and money to assuage their fears. The power structure in the region, now turned on its head, would persist similarly as it does now.

The irony of this result is that it’s business as usual for the Middle East. While the allies will have shifted, the in-built geopolitical needs still must be met. There will still be borders that overlap other borders and shared resources to be fought over.

Short-Term Likelihood: Possible, but unlikely

3. Go to war with Iran

The U.S. will come to understand that negotiations have continued to go nowhere. While the U.S. is playing the game to reach a settlement, Iran is playing the game to keep playing the game. Once the world perceives that Iran can keep playing indefinitely, America will lose its credibility. If it does that, other nations will create friction with the America-imposed order. The irony is that this turn of events is more likely under a Democratic administration than under a Republican one.

Here’s why: The widespread and erroneous assumption is that Democrats are inherently weak. This has frequently created the need for those administrations to prove they’re not weak. Some prior crises that emerged under Democratic administrations were the Cuban missile crisis, World War I, and World War II. It may satisfy those of the left and the right to imagine that Democrats are doves (though for different reasons), it’s not historically accurate.

Partisan responses: This outcome is disappointing for the left, who wish to believe Obama is a dove. The right would be of two minds. The inner mind will be surprised (and impressed) that Obama could make a bold decision, but few will say so. The public face of the right would criticize the president for effectively opening up what will be seen as a third front in the Global War on Terror.

Result: No ground troops would be employed. It would be Bosnia-ish, with military facilities and naval assets targeted. Of course, any purported nuclear facilities will be reduced to rubble. The aftermath would find American money supporting government dissidents. Unlike prior support for the Shah, the U.S. will take great care to support social moderates. There will be no formal attempt to replace the government. The work in Iraq and Afghanistan takes up too much bandwidth.

Hamas will be fully activated at a global level. Other regional actors would take great care not to enter the American cross-hairs. This operation would aim to knock Iran down as the primary regional force, creating the space for an ascendant Turkey and Israel to expand their influence further. Russia would be angry at its allies’ losses and emboldened to more overtly oppose American aims.

Short-Term Likelihood: Very likely

Conclusion

Each of these possibilities amounts to nothing more than my educated guess. In this read, a limited war with Iran seems the most likely. The feelings of partisan Americans is what’s very interesting to me. The more I wonder about geopolitics, the more partisan political bickering seems trivial. To me, Fox News used to seem merely misrepresentative, now it seems more like Us Magazine.

It is still possible that the Obama administration will let Iran play the game, but what makes this round different is Israel. Even if the U.S. were to swear off action against Iran, it could still be drawn into conflict. If Israel regards Iranian ambitions as an existential threat, they will try to strike targets in Iran. The Iranians will then begin mining the Strait of Hormuz to keep naval vessels out. This is a key trading route, so America, as protector of the trade-system, is effectively forced to intervene to keep the strait open.

It’s worth restating that I would love to be wrong about these assertions. I think there’s a high likelihood that I will be wrong, the question is only how. A year from now, it’ll be interesting to look back on these events. In the mean time, let’s poke some holes in this essay:

• What do these assumptions say about the limitations of my perspective?
• What’s the timetable on possible actions against Iran?
• Am I trapped in geopolitical mechanics to the point where I can’t see alternative options?
• If there are options other than these, what are they? How can I know where to look?
• What if Americans decided to cede their dominant global position, as far left doves would prefer?
• How much pain would that entail? Would we really be interested? What would be the results?

These are questions I pose to not only myself, but anyone else out there interested in this conversation. There’s a lot of room for discussion, but StratFor doesn’t have forums anymore so I’ll have to find a way to discuss them constructively. It should be obvious that I want to avoid the heated, frothing-at-the-mouth ad hominem screaming that passes for critical discourse.

Posted via email from Matt’s Workbench