An article over at The New Republic entitled The Perils of Polarization sheds some light on America’s current round of social fragmentation. Mr. Galston’s blog entry is worth the read; it’s short and to the point. Excerpt:
It remains the case that Washington is more polarized than the nation as a whole. The most recent analysis using the standard political science scoring system found zero ideological overlap between Democrats and Republicans in either chamber of Congress. Which means that in both the House and the Senate, the most conservative Democrat is more liberal than is the most liberal Republican. In the electorate, Democrats who consider themselves moderate or conservative still overlap with similar Republican identifiers. But as Republicans have shed liberals and moderates over the past generation, the overlap has diminished. (Galston)
After reading the article, I couldn’t help but apply it toward what I’ve read about Strauss & Howe’s model of generational change. For those among you who are new to the concept of a turning, here’s the quick and dirty Wikipedia definition (divided and annotated for ease of reference):
Turnings last about 20 years and always arrive in the same order. Four of them make up the cycle of history, which is about the length of a long human life.
The first turning is a High (post WWII period), a period of confident expansion as a new order becomes established after the old has been dismantled.
Next comes an Awakening (60′s cultural change), a time of rebellion against the now-established order, when spiritual exploration becomes the norm.
Then comes an Unraveling (the culture wars), an increasingly troubled era of strong individualism that surmounts increasingly fragmented institutions.
Last comes the Fourth Turning (the short-now), an era of upheaval, a Crisis in which society redefines its very nature and purpose. (Wikipedia)
An excellent graphic depicting how 'the short-now' looks within the Strauss & Howe generational framework. Click the image to read an excellent overview of the model over at "The Gen X files" blog.
While the particulars of the Generational read are subject to debate, I’ve yet to find a more useful model when looking at the social change around us. As a result, my tendency is to see cultural change within their established framework.
Back to Galston’s article
American politics now seems condemned to an extended period of intense polarization, with an expanding army of aroused conservatives fighting to halt and reverse what it sees as the deplorable Europeanization of our economy and society. I doubt that a politics so configured will be able to address our long-term economic problems—until a crisis forces us to. I hope I’m wrong. (Galston)
This is centered around the crisis being of the domestic variety. While that’s certainly part of it, what is not addressed is how the inevitable foreign war will eventually fit into this.
In reading about the start of America’s entry into World War II, I’m struck by how surprised Japan was that we would react to Pearl Harbor with such intensity. They had good reasons to be surprised, given that we had exhibited some timidity in the recent past when confronted by other powers.
What Japan could not appreciate was the cyclical nature of America’s change. Weak though we were, their attack became something more than it should have been because of our place in the cycle. It strikes me as the national equivalent of a mid-life crisis.
“Crap. Everything sucks. Time to get our shit together. We’re getting picked on. Our wife left. We have no money, no savings, and even the dog’s died.”
- the America of my mind’s eye, circa the early 1940′s
Then we get ourselves into rehab
I shudder to think of who will be the unlucky power to oppose us when our crisis crystallizes and – once again – becomes something more than just a war. How we handle ourselves, the lessons we learn, and how the crisis concludes itself will define us during the next period. As is usual in American foreign policy, it will define the hell out of the opposing nations as well.
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