The Geopolitics of our Post-Election Hangover

November 2nd has come and gone. With a firm Republican House and an evenly divided Senate, Obama will be unable to push his domestic agenda any further. I’m willing to bet that he saw this coming. It’s a good thing he got so much done in the first two years.

Is it a referendum? It depends on who you ask. Mid-term elections are a fuzzy indicator of the national mood. The people who voted on Tuesday may overlap with the people that vote in a regular ol’ presidential election, but they’re still two different pools of voters. It’s very venn diagrammy…

When the economy is trash, whoever is more motivated gets the advantage. If the balance of control were flipped on its end, it would have been Democrats regaining control of the house. I’m not suggesting that American elections are a puppet theater, but we may be made of felt.

The Geopolitical Angle

But how does the election effect geopolitics? Mostly, not at all, but with an exception. Whether you agree with him or not, StratFor’s George Friedman is nothing if not a hard-nosed realist. In a recent piece, he argues that, in the wake of the election results, Obama has three options:

1. Press his agenda (knowing it’ll be voted down)
2. Abandon his agenda (become more of a centrist)
3. Shift focus from domestic to foreign policy

I think Obama will go with option 2. He is nothing if not a technocrat. But if the House won’t play ball, he’ll go to option 1 in an attempt to energize his base in advance of possible re-election. But what about option 3?

This is the least likely, but if he goes that route, Iran is the safest target (in a political sense). Obama’s supporters and detractors would be left scratching their heads, though for different reasons. The last two paragraphs of the piece effectively sum up Friedman’s thoughts:

I am arguing the following. First, Obama will be paralyzed on domestic policies by this election. He can craft a re-election campaign blaming the Republicans for gridlock. This has its advantages and disadvantages; the Republicans, charging that he refused to adjust to the electorate’s wishes, can blame him for the gridlock. It can go either way. The other option for Obama is to look for triumph in foreign policy where he has a weak hand. The only obvious way to achieve success that would have a positive effect on the U.S. strategic position is to attack Iran. Such an attack would have substantial advantages and very real dangers. It could change the dynamics of the Middle East and it could be a military failure.

I am not claiming that Obama will decide to do this based on politics, although no U.S. president has ever engaged in foreign involvement without political considerations, nor should he. I am saying that, at this moment in history, given the domestic gridlock that appears to be in the offing, a shift to a foreign policy emphasis makes sense, Obama needs to be seen as an effective commander in chief and Iran is the logical target. (Friedman)

A StratFor skeptic would have a pretty easy time painting this as backhanded military advocacy. But if so, to what end? It doesn’t fit any partisan narratives. Friedman repeatedly writes that contrary to the average citizen’s expectations, presidents have to reckon with institutional limitations and so have fewer options than we like to think.

Powerful Ironies

In a more recent piece, StratFor explains why expectations of Obama’s next moves could be wrong.

…One of the most widespread misconceptions about the U.S. political system is that a president who is weak at home is by default weak abroad. This is a belief primarily promulgated by Americans themselves. After all, if one cannot get behind one’s leader, what business does that leader have engaging in global affairs?

But in reality, a president who is weak at home often wields remarkable power abroad. The U.S. Constitution forces the American president to share domestic power with Congress, so a split government leads to domestic policy gridlock. However, the Constitution also expressly reserves all foreign policy — particularly military policy — for the presidency. In fact, a weak president often has no options before him except foreign policy.

This is something that the rest of the world repeatedly has failed to grasp. Domestically weakened American presidents have often done more than engage in foreign policy: They have overturned entire international orders. Former U.S. President George W. Bush defied expectations after his 2006 midterm electoral defeat and launched the surge in Iraq, utterly changing the calculus of that war. Clinton launched the Kosovo War, which undid what remained of the Cold War security architecture. Most famously, John Kennedy, whom the Soviets had written off as a weak and naive dilettante who had surrounded himself with incompetent advisers (sound familiar?), gave the Russians their biggest Cold War diplomatic defeat in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The United States might be distracted and its president domestically weakened, and undoubtedly most of the world will assume that they know what this means. But history tells a very different story, and this president — like his predecessors — is not done just yet. (StratFor)

Feeling overwhelmed by all this? If so, click the image and view this poignant reminder of the transitory nature of politics.

Personally, I’m not in favor of starting another goddamn war, however limited it’s supposed to be. Sure, air wars are much easier. Mostly, you can call it done whenever you like. But it’s worth considering this option if only because I’m not in favor of it. None of us imagines that our guy would do something we don’t like, but then reality vomits in our lap. And while I have a gut feeling that Obama would rather be remembered for what didn’t happen on his watch, my gut is a lousy psychic.

Let’s face it: We the people are fickle, simplistic, and largely ignorant of geopolitics. We see only as far as our own narrow interests and we don’t do nuance very well. We have a Rube Goldberg device composed of half-baked ideas, misconceptions, well intentioned bumbling, and raw ignorance. Add a pinch of egotism and flavor to your liking. Any intellectual component of our political aims is overshadowed by our profound emotionalism.

That’s the proverbial elephant in the room; we don’t want to talk about it. Blinded as I am with my own biases and misconceptions, maybe it’s time to get my shovel ready. The elephant might lift its tail.