Shaping the Post-Iraq War Inevitability

Even though they feel never-ending, wars eventually end. If the U.S. somehow possessed a bottomless popcorn tub of political will, we’d still need lots and lots of money. And, the farther away our nation is, the worse the pressure on that money-hose gets. Supply lines. Local negotiations. Stuff like that. It’s all such a headache.

Anyway, with regard to Iraq, we are very far away. Iran, its neighbor, is very, very close. Ending the war was always going to take that reality into account. After we dust off our hands and call it over, the region will spend a lot of time adjusting. It won’t be over for them.

In around a week, Turkey will host a meeting between Iran and the U.N. Security council*. Iran has the largest military on the block, Hezbollah, and vague, ghostly threats of (maybe) nukes. They appear to have a lot of levers. They are in a strong position.

Visit scenic Iraq. Once we get the hell out of there, peace and tranquility can return to this region that has never known conflict before Americans arrived.

Appearing Nuts is not Crazy

You know how North Korea surprises us with its wacky antics? Other nations have taken note. Here’s a fun little game you can try the next time someone dismisses any of these allegedly rogue nations as irrational and/or crazy.

Ask this question: Did that crazy thing get U.S. attention? The answer is almost always yes.

North Korea and Iran are not nuts. Trapped in a news cycle that can’t see the forest for the trees, we misinterpret what only appears crazy. As usual, I’m pulling from the Stratfor take on the situation.

No one does anything about North Korea militarily because it is more of a nuisance than a threat, even with its artillery in range of Seoul (fixed artillery positions are perfect targets for U.S. air power).  Negotiations and occasional aid solve the problem. Iran’s position is much more significant and goes far beyond potential nuclear weapons. If the United States withdraws from the region, Iran becomes the most powerful conventional power in the Persian Gulf, regardless of whether it has nuclear weapons. Given that the United States is officially bound to leave Iraq by the end of this year, Iran is becoming substantially more powerful.

Friedman and company have long maintained that a possible, though counter-intuitive, possibility is that the U.S. will normalize relations with Iran. With most favored nation status bestowed, the U.S. could reestablish a security framework friendly to its interests. But, plenty of very smart people have other ideas. So, what if this weird, seemingly unlikely reversal doesn’t happen?

If Iraq becomes an Iranian ally or satellite, the Iraqi-Saudi and Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier becomes, effectively, the frontier with Iran.  The psychological sense in the region will be that the United States has no appetite for resisting Iran. Having asked the Americans to deal with the Iranians — and having failed to get them to do so, the Saudis will have to reach some accommodation with Iran. In other words, with the most strategically located country in the Middle East — Iraq — Iran now has the ability to become the dominant power in the Middle East and simultaneously reshape the politics of the Arabian Peninsula.

Wikileaks has done a fair job of confirming the most cynical thoughts of security analysts. They’ve also revealed that, yes, Saudi Arabia is pathologically afraid of increased Iranian power.

The Iranians would not have to invade militarily to be able to reshape the region. It would be sufficient for there to be the potential for Iran to invade. It would shift the regime survival question away from Iran to Saudi Arabia. U.S. troops in Kuwait would help but would not change the basic equation. The Saudis would understand that having left Iraq, the United States would be quite capable of leaving Kuwait. The pressure on the Saudis to accommodate the Iranians would be terrific, since they would have to hedge their bets on the United States. As for basing troops in Saudi Arabia itself, the risks pyramid, since the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield and Desert Storm helped trigger the rise of al Qaeda.

So, what do our assurances mean? Maybe, if some other regional power could get involved…

Local Intermediary

Turkey is on a diplomatic tear. Can they do anything to help broker a peaceful settlement? I hope so

Like Germany, Turkey has begun flexing its foreign policy muscle. It appears stronger and more confident, and willing to take something of a regional leadership role.

It is all very good to want to negotiate as a neutral party, but the most important party isn’t at the table: Saudi Arabia. Turkey wants to play a dominant role in the Muslim world without risking too much in terms of military force. The problem for Turkey, therefore, is not so much bringing the United States and Iran closer but bringing the Saudis and Iranians closer, and that is a tremendous challenge not only because of religious issues but also because Iran wants to be what Saudi Arabia opposes most: the dominant power in the region. The Turkish problem is to reconcile the fundamental issue in the region, which is the relationship between Persians and Arabs.

As the Americans have learned, no one will thank them for it, and no one will think better of them for doing it. The only reason for a deeper involvement as mediator in the P-5+1 talks is that stabilizing the region and maintaining the Persian-Arab balance of power is in Turkey’s national interest.

So, Turkey will have a say. Good luck, guys. And, good luck to the Kurdish minorities in the region. You’re going to need it.

The end results of the war will likely defy everyone’s predictions. Or match our fears. Or become another variety of mess. As you can see, I’m really committed to nailing down an opinion. Maybe, we’ll hammer out a decent framework of understanding. It could happen.

It seems to me that reaching anything resembling a conclusion involves everyone getting something. But, nobody should get exactly what they want.

All quoted text is from “The Turkish Role in Negotiations with Iran,” republished with permission of STRATFOR.”